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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Issue
This paper discusses the scope of a prosecutor’s duty to disclose evidence of an ongoing
or pending investigation to the defense under Rules for Courts-Martial 701(a)(6) regarding
exculpatory or impeachment evidence.1 As it is well-established through case law that
prosecutors must disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants, this paper specifically discusses
the lengths to which a prosecutor must go in order to search files of pending investigations in
order to discover exculpatory or impeachment evidence, particularly if relevant to impeachment
of a government witness; what a prosecutor must disclose in the case of a top-secret
investigation; and what evidence the prosecutor must hand over regarding impeachment of
defense or non-testifying witnesses. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), along with
the Rules for Courts-Martial and Military Rules of Evidence mirror the Federal Rules of
Evidence and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and a comparison between the two systems
offers insight into the scope of a prosecutor’s duty to disclose evidence to the defense for
exculpatory or impeachment purposes.
B. Summary of Conclusions
i. Scope of Prosecutor’s Duty to Discover and Disclose Evidence of an Ongoing
Investigation of a Government Witness
If the agency or office performing the investigation in question is deemed closely related
to the prosecution, and the individual in question is named as a suspect on the investigatory file,

1

Under Rules for Courts-Martial 701(a)(6), the government is required to disclose evidence that negates
the guilt of the accused, reduces the degree of guilt of the accused, or lessens the punishment. This
includes both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. One area of ambiguity, however, is what the scope
of trial counsel’s responsibilities are as it relates to searching files of investigations that are pending or in
progress. And what, if any, information must be disclosed from those pending investigations specifically
in regards to possible impeachment evidence of a government witness? Furthermore, is disclosure of
impeachment evidence regarding a defense or non-testifying witness required?

6

then the prosecution has a duty to disclose this information for impeachment purposes under
Rules for Courts-Martial 701(a)(6). While the term “closely related” is not well-defined in the
law, the courts use a case-by-case analysis to determine the relationship between the office or
agency conducting the ongoing investigation and the prosecutor’s office. Case law provides
certain guidelines establishing where a prosecutor has a duty to search for evidence, and to what
extent the prosecutor must, in good faith, look for evidence requested by the defense in order to
comply with the standards set forth by Rules for Courts-Martial 701(a)(6). The prosecutor need
not go on a wild goose chase, but the court can and will determine if the prosecutor did or should
have had knowledge about an ongoing investigation based on the relationship between the
prosecutor’s office and the other agency or office performing the investigation, or the
relationship between the prosecutor’s office and the entity who is under investigation in a given
scenario.
ii. Scope of Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Information Related to a Top-Secret
Investigation
If an investigation is top-secret and involves a matter that is a military secret, the agency
holding the information may possibly be able to claim Military Privilege under Rules for CourtsMartial 505, and the prosecution would not be able to disclose this information to the defense for
any purpose. If the evidence of the ongoing investigation being used for impeachment is not a
military secret, then the courts will likely impose a balancing test using a standard similar to the
“necessary and helpful” test that Federal Courts use when determining whether the government
must hand over evidence for witness impeachment purposes to defendants charged with
terrorism. While the case law and precedent in this area is recent, unclear, and not very plentiful,
it is likely that issues regarding security clearances may cause issues of fundamental fairness to
the defense when a top-secret investigation arises. Therefore, it is important for an impartial

7

judge to evaluate the top-secret evidence to determine if it is “necessary and helpful” to a
defendant.
iii. Scope of Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Impeachment Evidence of Defense
Witness or Non-Testifying Witnesses
A prosecutor does not have a duty to disclose information from pending investigations
involving evidence that might serve to impeach defense or non-testifying witnesses. The defense
can and should reasonably question its own witnesses to discover such information; and
impeachment of non-testifying witnesses would be irrelevant. The purpose of Rules for CourtsMartial 701(a)(6) mirrors that of Brady v. Maryland 2 in the Federal system. Brady serves to give
defendants access to information held by the government, in order to preserve the defendant’s
right to a fair trial.3 The same policy rationale behind prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory or
impeachment evidence should apply in military court. There is no need to impeach non-testifying
witnesses, because their statements will not be used in court, so their credibility does not need to
be attacked. The Jencks Act and the policy of not requiring disclosure of statements made by
government witnesses until after they testify in court may also help to shed light onto this issue,
especially in regards to non-testifying witnesses and the relevance of their statements for
impeachment purposes.

2

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source 1]
3

Id.
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II. Factual Background
A. Disclosure Rules for Courts-Martial 701(a)(6)
The language of Rules for Courts-Martial 701(a)(6) (herein after “RCM”) states that “the
trial counsel shall disclose evidence that reasonably tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
reduces the degree of guilt of the accused of an offense charged, or lessens the punishment.”4
This includes both exculpatory evidence, and impeachment evidence that may aid in the
preparation of a defense. Under military standards, the prosecution must “disclose all evidence
that tends to: negate guilt, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence.”5 This means that the
prosecution must hand over such exculpatory or mitigating evidence, whether or not the defense
even requests it.
B. Federal Standards for Disclosure under Brady and Giglio
There are varying standards for when and how the prosecution must disclose evidence
that is favorable to a defendant. The Federal standard for discovery is outlined in Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16, and is clarified in the Supreme Court case Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963). The Federal Rules of Criminal procedure also address discovery matters in Rule
16. While Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 does not codify Brady, it provides certain guidelines that are less
stringent than what the Brady Court required for disclosure to the defense.6 The Brady Court

4

Manual for Courts-Martial (2012 Edition) pg. II-56. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 27]
5

16th Military Justice Manager’s Course Deskbook, IV. Government Discovery Responsibilities and
Requests (A)(1)(a)(3), citing United States v. Kinzer, 39 M.J. 559, 562 (A.C.M.R. 1994), United States v.
Adens, 56 M.J. 724 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2002). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source 33]
6

Andrew Smith, Brady Obligations, Criminal Sanctions, and Solutions in a New Era of Scrutiny, 61
Vand. L. Rev. 6:1935, 1946 (2008), citing Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. On Criminal Rules,
Minutes of Oct. 1-2, 2007, at 5, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CR10-2007-min.pdf.
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 34]
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held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”7 Here, the Court established the standard that prosecutors
must disclose exculpatory or mitigation evidence to the defense. In Giglio v. United States, the
Supreme Court expanded its holding in Brady to include impeachment evidence of a witness
through its decision. The Court held in Giglio that the prosecution must disclose to the defense
any promise of leniency or deal offered to a witness in exchange for testimony, because such
evidence is material to the defense’s case in that it could be used for impeachment purposes
during cross examination of that witness.8
The Court further clarified the Brady and Giglio standards through its decision in United
States v. Bagley.9 Here, the court states:
When the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within the general
rule of Brady. We do not, however, automatically require a new trial whenever a
combing of the prosecutors’ files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly
useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict…A finding of
materiality of the evidence is required under Brady…A new trial is required if the
false testimony could…in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment
of the jury.
This clarifies the meaning of the vague phrase “material” evidence, as used in both Brady and
Giglio. That is, materiality of evidence hinges on whether or not there is a “reasonable

7

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source 1]
8

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 2]
9

United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source 9]
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probability” that disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in a different outcome in the
case.10 This same standard is applied by the Federal Courts in determining whether or not to
grant a remedy to the defendant for a prosecutor’s failure to disclose such evidence. A typical
remedy would be a new trial, but without a showing of materiality, a court will not find
reversible error.
RCM 701(a)(6) is the military’s codified version of Brady. The main difference to keep
in mind between RCM 701(a)(6) and Brady is the “reasonably tends” test instead of “material.”
This difference in language is because “reasonably tends” can be applied at trial more easily,
“where the parties are arguing prospectively,” as opposed to the retrospective test applied by
appellate courts in Brady.11
C. Examples of Situations where a Prosecutor Must Disclose Evidence to the
Defense
Military law generally establishes that a prosecutor has a duty to disclose evidence of an
ongoing investigation for the purposes of impeachment in situations that involve truthfulness,
bias, or scientific accuracy.12 As provided for in Military Rule of Evidence 607 (hereinafter
“MRE”), as well as Federal Rule of Evidence 607 (hereinafter “FRE”), either side is entitled to
impeach any witness in a trial.13 These standards are well-established in Federal Courts, and
applied by Military Courts.

10

Id. at 3383.

16th Military Justice Manager’s Course Deskbook, IV(A)(1)(d)(2). [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 33]
11

12

Id. at IV(A)(2)

13

Military Rules of Evidence § 607, Federal Rules of Evidence 607. [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 26]
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First, a prosecutor must disclose evidence of any deals or promises made to a witness in
exchange for testimony.14 Such disclosure allows the defense to thoroughly examine the witness
as to his/her motivations for testifying, and can be used to impeach the credibility of the
witness’s testimony. This is an extension of the Federal standard established in Giglio.
Second, the prosecution must disclose evidence of a “specific instance[] of conduct of a
witness for the purpose of attacking the witness’s credibility or character for truthfulness.15 For
instance, in the case of United States v. Watson, the court held that a “monetary interest in the
outcome of the trial” can be “a motive to lie, [and] can obviously be material evidence at a
criminal trial.”16
Third, a specific instance of conduct regarding the job performance of a witness must
also be disclosed to the defense for impeachment purposes. In United States v. Mahoney, the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held where the defendant was charged with violating
drug policies, the prosecution had a duty to disclose evidence that the expert witness who tested
the urine samples was being criticized for poor job performance and for his methodology in
testing the samples.17
Fourth, and similar to the previous example, the prosecution is required to disclose
evidence of ongoing investigations regarding the impeachment of a scientific test or analysis that

14

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source 2]
15

16th Military Justice Manager’s Course Deskbook, at IV(A)(2)(b)

16

United States v. Watson, 31 M.J. 49, 54 (C.A.A.F. 1990). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source 22]
17

United States v. Mahoney, 58 M.J. 346, 347-48 (C.A.A.F. 2003). [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 15]
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may exculpate the defendant. This is particularly relevant with regard to drug or blood tests that
are used to convict a defendant of an offense, and challenging the accuracy of the lab analyses
behind these tests. In United States v. Sebring, the court held that in a case where the defendant
was accused of illegal marijuana usage, the prosecution withheld material evidence when it
failed to provide the defense with copies of quality control information regarding the validity of
the lab testing.18 The court held that Navy drug-testing facilities are within the reach of the
prosecution, and that such information would “reasonably tend” to change the outcome of the
trial, and that the prosecution consequently was required to disclose this information to the
defense.19
in United States v. Sanchez, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals similarly
applied this “reasonably tends” to change the outcome of the trial standard to internal reports of
irregularities regarding drug testing labs.20 The court in Sanchez further extended this disclosure
to apply to facts and evidence, not just final results or reports, as it is the facts and evidence that
make up the reports that are important.21 Even though there was no official internal report
completed before Sanchez’s trial, there were internal reports of irregularities and corrections
taken to fix these issues before trial, and the prosecution was required to disclose this evidence.22

18

United States v. Sebring, 44 M.J. 805, 809 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 1996). [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 20]
19

Id.

20

United States v. Sanchez, 1997 CCA LEXIS 619, *4-5 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 1997). [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 19]
21

Id.

22

Id.

13

Fifth, as provided for in MRE 613(a), as well as FRE 613, a witness may always be
impeached by a prior inconsistent statement. In United States v. Romano, the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces held that even though a witness had changed her story approximately five
times, the prosecution still should have handed over all evidence of conversations showing that
the witness had changed her story because this evidence would impeach the credibility of the
witness.23 Further, such statements must be disclosed by the prosecution even when they are
made in the investigation of the co-accused, if they are “inconsistent with the government’s main
witness’ testimony at trial.”24
Case law establishes that the prosecution must disclose certain types of ongoing
investigations to the defense for the purposes of impeachment evidence. However, the exact
scope and limitation of the obligation is unclear. The legal argument section of this paper will
discuss the areas where the law is unclear, and conclude that pursuant to RCM 701(a)(6),
available case law, and analogous Federal situations, prosecutors should likely err on the side of
disclosure of information that may be useful for impeaching a government witness, and should
act in good faith when looking for such evidence during the discovery process.
III. Legal Argument
A. Scope of Prosecutor’s Duty to Discover and Disclose Evidence of an Ongoing
Investigation of a Prosecution Witness
Statutes and cases establish basic standards for how far a prosecutor must look for
evidence that “reasonably tends” to provide exculpatory evidence or impeachment evidence in

23

United States v. Romano, 46 M.J. 269, 273 (C.A.A.F. 1997). [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 18]
16th Military Justice Manager’s Course Deskbook, at IV(A)(2)(b)(2)(f). [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 33]
24
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order to satisfy its obligation of disclosure to the defense. While there is no “constitutional
requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all
police investigatory work on a case,”25 the prosecution is still responsible for providing evidence
to the defense that is not otherwise readily available.26 A prosecutor must disclose evidence that
he/she actually possesses, as well as any investigative files held by the prosecutor’s own office.
However, there is ambiguity as to how far a prosecutor must look outside of his/her own files or
information, and when a prosecutor has looked far enough to fulfill his/her obligation. According
to the Supreme Court in both Giglio and Brady, the prosecutor does not need to have bad faith in
order to commit the violation of suppressing evidence.27 A prosecutor can commit a suppression
of evidence without ever having actual knowledge that the evidence itself exists.28 This means
that a prosecutor can violate the responsibilities under MRE 701(a)(6) by simply not looking far
enough for evidence, not looking in the right location for evidence, or otherwise missing a
source. The burden to find and disclose material evidence rests solely on the prosecution; but the
courts have been wholly unclear as to where the prosecutor is and is not responsible for
disclosure. Through an analysis of where courts have set specific boundaries, it is possible to
suggest where the line may fall, and where a prosecutor’s duty may end. While a prosecutor
should not go on a “wild goose hunt” for information that may or may not exist, this paper

25

Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source 4]
26

Id.

27

Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2]

28

Id.
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suggests that a prosecutor search as far as reasonably possible for exculpatory or impeachment
evidence, because standards for requiring disclosure of ongoing investigations remain unclear.
In general, the standards for disclosure of this type of material are more generous for
defendants in courts-martial proceedings than in civilian trials. The court in United States v.
Eshalomi established this generous standard for discovery in courts-martial proceedings.
Although Bagley may prescribe the minimal constitutional requirements of
disclosure, it does not prevent Congress or the President from prescribing higher
standards for courts-martial. As we read Article 46 of the Uniform Code, 10 USC
§ 846 – which was enacted when discovery for defendants was almost nonexistent
in state and federal criminal trials – Congress intended more generous discovery
to be available for military accused. Indeed, as we interpret this article, defense
counsel have been denied “equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and other
evidence” if a trial counsel unilaterally and without court approval denies a
defense request for statements or records in his possession.29
i. General Limits to a Prosecutor’s Duty to Discover Ongoing Investigations
Military Courts have outlined expectations of how far a prosecutor does need to look for
evidence of ongoing investigations outside its own case materials. Expectations are generally
limited to: “1. The files of law enforcement authorities that have participated in the investigation
of the subject matter of the charged offense…2. Investigative files in a related case maintained
by an entity closely aligned with the prosecution…[and] 3. Other files, as designated in a defense
discovery request, that involved a specific type of information within a specific entity.”30 The
duty to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence applies to the prosecution even in the
absence of a specific request for such information by the defense.31 The latter inclusion is due to

29

United States v. Eshalomi, 23 M.J. 12, 24 (C.M.A. 1986). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source 11]
30

United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 441 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (internal citations omitted). [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 24]
31

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source 7]
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issues of fundamental fairness. The rules in Brady and RCM 701(a)(6) exist for purposes of
aiding a defendant in preparing his/her defense. Due to an inherent imbalance of power in the
system with the prosecution generally outweighing the defense, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 “attempts to ensure that a qualified flow of information exists between the
prosecution and the defense in federal cases.”32 Defendants typically have less resources
available than the prosecution does, so it is only just for the prosecution to be required to hand
over evidence of investigations that the defense may not even know exist. The policy behind the
prosecution’s need to hand over certain information without a request stems from the
comparative disadvantage that defendants have in knowing whether or not some sort of
information or investigation actually exists.
a. Files of Law Enforcement Authorities that have Participated in the
Investigation of the Subject Matter of the Charged Offense
It seems obvious that the prosecutor must search files from those who participated in the
investigation behind the charged offense. This “core” of files includes the prosecution’s files in
the case, as well as “favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf in the
case, including the police.”33 For example, in United States v. Simmons, the prosecution did not
hand over to the defense evidence of a polygraph taken by a prosecution witness when the
defense made a discovery request for favorable impeachment evidence.34 This was a rape case,

32

Andrew Smith, Brady Obligations, Criminal Sanctions, and Solutions in a New Era of Scrutiny, 61
Vand. L. Rev. 6:1935, 1946-56 (2008), citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1974
amendment (“explaining that the Rule ‘is revised to give greater discovery to both the prosecution and the
defense.’”) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 34]
33

Williams, 50 M.J. at 441, citing United States v. Simmons, 38 M.J. 376 (C.M.A. 1993), quoting Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source
24]
34

Simmons, 38 M.J. at 381. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 21]
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and the polygraph test questioned the witness directly about the circumstances surrounding the
alleged rape.35 The court in Simmons held that the prosecution has a duty to seek out information
in the possession of other “military authorities” and to inspect these documents for discovery.36
Therefore, the prosecution should have handed over this evidence because it was from a law
enforcement authority who participated in the underlying investigation for the charged offense.
The prosecution is responsible for giving the defense access to items such as police reports, and
investigations conducted by any sort of government agency that would have a close relationship
to the prosecution.
b. Investigative Files in a Related Case Maintained by an Entity Closely
Related to the Prosecution
The courts are clear that “when results or reports of military scientific tests or
experiments are requested by the defense, such a request cannot be satisfied by making available
for inspection only those reports within the possession, custody, or control of trial counsel.”37 “If
relevant files are known to be under the control of another governmental entity, the trial counsel
must inform the trial defense counsel of that fact and engage in good faith efforts to obtain the
information.”38 While it may be ambiguous what the phrase “closely related to the prosecution”
means in a given circumstance, there are times when its meaning is quite clear. For example,
where quality control regarding scientific data would compromise the integrity of the results in a

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

United States v. Noce, 2005 CCA LEXIS 130, *10 (N-M C. Ct. Crim. App. 2005), citing Williams, 50
M.J. at 441. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 17]
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case, the prosecution should be aware of this information. Further, case law outlines that police
departments and other government agencies with whom the prosecution usually works are
considered to be “closely related.”39 Courts will determine on a case-by-case basis, but if the
information about the investigation is held by the police, or another governmental or military
agency, or a company that the governmental agency contracts with, the court will likely find that
this is “closely related” for the disclosure purposes of RCM 701(a)(6), and that prosecutorial
disclosure is required.
c. Other Files, as Designated Within a Discovery Request, that Involve a
Specific Type of Information Within a Specified Entity
When the defense makes a specific request for the prosecution to look at information,
then the prosecution must look into this information. In United States v. Jackson, the outcome of
the case rested heavily on a urinalysis.40 The defense specifically requested evidence pertaining
to the testing lab’s quality control.41 However, the prosecution did not disclose to the defense
evidence in the form of a report “demonstrating that the laboratory processes had misidentified a
negative Blind Quality Control specimen as positive for the presence of drugs.”42 When the
prosecution failed to hand over this document, it led the defense to assume that no such
document existed, and this violated the defendant’s discovery rights.43 As the defense is not
privy to what information actually does exist, it is the prosecutor’s duty to seek out information
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when the defendant asks for something so specific, especially when the defense specifies a type
of information and an exact location, such as a lab, from which that information should be
sought. The information in Jackson was so crucial to the defendant’s case because three of the
individuals involved in the Quality Control report were also involved in testing the defendant’s
specimen, and also stated that the technicians needed to “pay closer attention.”44 The blatant
failure to disclose a document such as this to the defense is an unacceptable error on the part of
the prosecution, and exactly what RCM 701(a)(6) intends to protect defendants against.
ii. When a Prosecutor Exercises Good Faith to Find Evidence for Impeachment or
Exculpatory Purposes
In United States v. Noce, a case involving rape, the government received access to
evidence that would be discoverable under RCM 701 and Brady two days after trial, and the case
agent generated final results five days thereafter.45 The court held that the government “exercised
good faith efforts to obtain the laboratory results” by taking distinct steps in order to get
information as soon as possible.46 This holding was reached 1) because the government put in an
urgent request to process the rape kit’s analysis, and told defense counsel that the evidence was
pending analysis; 2) the Forensic DNA Examiner completed the initial report only two days
before trial; 3) the Serology Division finalized the report two days after trial; and 4) the case
agent generated his report five days thereafter.47 It is also important to note that the defendant
waived his right to wait five days before proceeding to trial, and chose to forego the laboratory

44

Id.

45

United States v. Noce, 2005 CCA LEXIS 130 at *11. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 17]
46

Id.

47

Id.

20

results.48 However, the fact that the prosecution took these extensive steps was enough for the
court to hold that they fulfilled the duties required by RCM 701(a)(6).
Another situation where the court held that the prosecutors looked far enough for relevant
information arose in United States v. Williams. In Williams, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals
held that “a trial counsel’s duty to discover and disclose favorable evidence includes evidence
known to the trial counsel, the police, or others acting on the government’s behalf in the
particular case being investigated and prosecuted, but does not include evidence in unrelated
files.”49 Williams was a case involving a stabbing. When conducting an investigation into other
case files, the prosecution did not discover a file involving another stabbing incident where a
government witness, PFC F, was listed as a witness to the crime that was under investigation.50
The Army Court held that “trial counsel had no duty to discover this evidence, which was
located in an unrelated MPI file in which PFC F was listed as a witness, and not a suspect.”51
The Williams Army Court makes clear that because the witness was not a suspect in an
ongoing investigation, the prosecution did not breach any duty to the defense by not handing
over this case file. This detailed searching of files is the type of “searching for a needle in a
haystack” that the courts hope to prevent. The court is unclear as to whether it would have
reached a different result, had PFC F been the actual subject of the investigation that the
prosecution failed to disclose to the defense. However, it seems likely that had PFC F been the
suspect of the investigation, the file would have been easy enough to discover, and since both
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cases involved stabbings, the prosecution would have likely needed to disclose this information
to the defense. It appears as though the line for what makes an ongoing investigation relevant for
impeachment value is if the individual testifying on behalf of the government is the same
individual listed as the suspect of the investigation. It does not matter that the crime from the
ongoing investigation is substantially the same as what the defendant is charged with, only that
the suspect of the investigation is a government witness.
iii. Conclusion
It is clear that prosecutors have a duty to look at their own “core” case files for evidence
of an ongoing investigation in order to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence to the
defense pursuant to RCM 701(a)(6). A prosecutor’s duty beyond that extends only to the files of
law enforcement agencies who took part in the investigation regarding the underlying offense,
such as a police department or Federal agency, any agency deemed by the court to be closely
related to the prosecutor’s office, an office that would provide scientific or medical data relevant
to the offense, or evidence specifically requested by the defense. A prosecutor does not need to
search for a “needle in a haystack,” and a court will likely determine that the prosecutor’s office
has exercised good faith to provide all evidence in its possession.
B. Scope of Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Information of a Top-Secret Investigation
When dealing with the military, it is entirely plausible that the prosecutor will run into a
situation where the evidence of an ongoing investigation that could possibly be helpful to the
defense for impeachment or exculpatory purposes may be top secret, or confidential in some
way. While the case law is not clear regarding how these types of investigations should be
disclosed to the defense, this paper proposes different methods of disclosing varying levels of
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confidential information, and how the courts could come to a solution that both is equitable to
the defense and respects military privileges and secrets.
i. Privilege Under Military Rule of Evidence 505
Military Rule of Evidence 505(a) provides that:
Classified information must be protected and is privileged from disclosure if
disclosure would be detrimental to the national security. Under no circumstances
may a military judge order the release of classified information to any person not
authorized to receive such information. The Secretary of Defense may prescribe
security procedures for protection against the compromise of classified
information submitted to courts-martial and appellate authorities.
However, pursuant to MRE 505(c), “any information admitted into evidence pursuant to any
rule, procedure, or order by the military judge must be provided to the accused.” This is
consistent with the aforementioned policy goals of providing the defendant in a courts-martial
situation with a wide range of discovery.
Under MRE 505, the government may claim privilege of certain information52. When this
happens, a judge should follow the procedures outlined through the entirety of MRE 505 to
determine if this information can or should be disclosed to a defendant. This disclosure is also
subject to MRE 505(h), stating that when the government claims privilege, “the military judge
may not authorize the discovery of or access to such classified information unless the military
judge determines that such classified information would be noncumulative and relevant to a
legally cognizable defense, rebuttal of the prosecution’s case, or to sentencing.”53 This means
that the judge has the final say as to how and if the defendant can actually gain access to
information that may be helpful to a defense. This rule does not necessarily build in access to
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evidence that would be used for impeachment of the prosecution, but it can be argued that
impeachment evidence of government witnesses falls under the category of “rebuttal of the
prosecution’s case” and therefore this type of evidence should be disclosed to the defense.
However, it is entirely possible that the military judge could make a judgment call that
impeachment evidence is not used to rebut the prosecution’s burden, and subsequently, it would
not be useful enough evidence for the defense to justify access.
ii. Comparison to Federal Terrorism Case
The most recent and prominent cases in Federal Courts involving issues of privilege
concerning national security are cases involving individuals charged with terrorism in the postSeptember 11th era. These cases apply a balancing test to determine if evidence that is a matter of
national security should be disclosed in order to help the defendant prepare his defense. Most of
these cases fall under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), which provides a set of
procedures for judges to use in determining whether classified information should be disclosed.54
These cases deal with serious issues of national security, but also the issue of needing to provide
defendants with the right to mount a defense.
In United States v. Amawi, the Sixth Circuit applied a standard of disclosing evidence that
is “relevant and helpful to the defense.”55 The “relevant and helpful” standard is also known as
the Yunis standard, as the phrase was first used by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Yunis.56
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This test is different and separate from Brady, and courts must apply both Brady and Yunis. The
Sixth Circuit followed a three-part test in determining whether the evidence was, in fact, relevant
and helpful. First, the court must find that the evidence is relevant.57 Next, the court must
“determine whether the assertion of privilege by the government is at least a colorable one.”58
Finally, “because classified information is not discoverable on a mere showing of theoretical
relevance…, the threshold for discovery in this context further requires that the information…is
at least helpful to the defense of the accused.”59 The Sixth Circuit notes that they are one of
seven Circuits to apply this “relevant and helpful” test created by the D.C. Circuit.60
The district court in Amawi stated that there was no exculpatory material that would have
aided the defendant under Brady, nor was there any helpful evidence that would apply under the
Yunis standard of “relevant and helpful.”61 However, the Sixth Circuit also makes clear that the
standards of Yunis are much easier to satisfy than the materiality standard of Brady.62 Because of
this, the Sixth Circuit held that the classified evidence did not overcome the privilege, and the
defendant was denied access to this information.63
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iii. Issues of Fundamental Fairness to Defendants
Cases involving privileged or confidential information bring with them the issue of
security clearances. When dealing with classified evidence, there are different levels of security
clearances necessary to view certain kinds of classified evidence. This was an issue in Amawi. In
Amawi, defense counsel submitted applications for security clearances in advance of trial, but the
government never processed those applications.64 Had the court determined that those documents
could be disclosed to the defense, the defense counsel still would not have been able to
participate in the discovery because they did not have the requisite level of clearance. This
presents an issue of fundamental fairness to defendants and defense counsel, because the
government is in control of both the prosecution of the defendant as well as the processing of all
security clearances.
A similar concern could arise if a defendant in a courts-martial situation employs
independent counsel who does not have the requisite military clearances to view the evidence
that is disclosed. Military courts should take these fundamental fairness concerns into account,
and prosecutors should think about the impact that a procedural step such as getting a clearance
might pose to the entirety of the defendant’s case.
iv. Conclusion and Possible Solutions
MRE 505 itself builds in alternatives to full discovery in the event of classified
information that prevents full disclosure to the defense.65 The military judge should assess the
defendant’s right to discovery and determine if any of the options in MRE 505(h)(2) are
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appropriate. These actions include: deleting or withholding classified information; substituting a
summary for classified information; substituting a statement admitting relevant facts of the
classified information would prove; or disclosing the information if it is necessary to the
defendant’s ability to prepare for trial.66 A judge may also order an in-camera review of any
classified materials that will not be disclosed to the defense, and can reconsider any motions
made by either party regarding classified evidence.67 One of these solutions may provide for an
outcome that is fundamentally fair for the defense, while still protecting the national security or
other important privileged evidence from the prosecution. Striking a balance between policy
concerns for secrecy and for fairness to the defendant is the appropriate way to come up with a
solution that benefits both sides, and ensures justice.
C. Scope of Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Impeachment Evidence of Defense or
Non-Testifying Witnesses
Looking to the purpose and intent behind Brady and RCM 701(a)(6), it does not appear
that the prosecution needs to disclose impeachment evidence of a defense or non-testifying
witness. In fact, it seems as though the purpose behind this rule is exactly the opposite.
i. A Prosecutor has No Duty to Disclose Impeachment Evidence of a Defense or NonTestifying Witness
According to the Court in United States v. Agurs, “Brady involves the discovery, after
trial of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.”68 As
explained by Professor Bennett L. Gershman of Pace University School of Law, “[a] prosecutor
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does not suppress evidence if the defendant already knows about the existence of the evidence. A
defendant’s actual or probable knowledge of the evidence may relieve a prosecutor of his Brady
obligation.”69 While the Supreme Court has not dealt with this issue directly, nor did Brady itself
specifically discuss the defendant’s personal or actual knowledge, it seems likely that the
purpose behind Brady is not to hold the prosecutor responsible for disclosing evidence that the
defendant could have, and should have reasonably obtained. The Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Bhutani held that “the government cannot be found to have suppressed evidence if the
same information was available to the defendant through the use of reasonable diligence.”70 A
defense counsel can and should reasonably question defense witnesses, and therefore, the
defense should have better knowledge of possible impeachment evidence than the prosecution.
Questioning defense witnesses is almost certainly within the reasonable diligence of defense
counsel in providing adequate representation to the defendant.
Simply because there may be an ongoing investigation does not mean that the witness
himself will not have actual knowledge of what is occurring better than the prosecution may. In
the case of impeachment evidence of defense witnesses, defense counsel should thoroughly
question witnesses, asking for any information before trial that could possibly lead to the witness
being impeached. In this manner, the defense can strategize and build its own trial theory based
on witnesses, and may choose not to call a certain witness due to the possibility of that witness
being impeached. The defense cannot expect the prosecution to build its case, and as a result,
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there is no reason why the prosecution should possibly have to hand over impeachment evidence
regarding an ongoing investigation of a defense witness, unless that evidence is also exculpatory
to the defendant, in which case, the evidence would always need to be disclosed under Brady.
Regarding impeachment evidence of non-testifying witnesses, this paper proposes that
prosecutors should not have to disclose evidence of ongoing investigations involving a nontestifying witness purely for an impeachment purpose. The purpose of impeachment is to attack
the credibility of a witness in front of a jury. If a witness is never going to be called before a jury,
or is never going to be part of a case, then that evidence is irrelevant, provided that it is not also
exculpatory. The Jencks Act deals further with witness testimony, and how courts address issues
of fundamental fairness regarding the disclosure of new witness testimony that may have
impeachment value, but is not exculpatory in nature.
ii. Jencks Act and Non-Testifying Witnesses
In the Federal system, the Jencks Act covers any statements given by government
witnesses before the trial.71 Under the Jencks Act, in a criminal case, any prior statements made
by a government witness are not discoverable until after the witness testifies on the stand.72 In
this manner, a non-testifying witness’s statements would never need to be turned over for
impeachment purposes. The Jencks Act typically covers statements that could be used for
impeachment evidence, and would be favorable to the defense in some manner. When a
government witness testifies, then the defense can move to have the court direct the prosecution
to produce those statements.73 The only real remedy for these statements is that the court usually
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gives the defense a recess in order to evaluate the information and look through it in order to
properly prepare for cross-examination. Jencks evidence does not give the defense the right to a
new trial or any other sort of relief. It is likely that the Jencks Act and its policies would apply in
a Courts-Martial situation as well, as the military law parallels Federal Law.
iii. Conclusion
While there is no military precedent that specifically establishes whether or not the
prosecutor must disclose evidence of an ongoing investigation for impeachment of a defense or
non-testifying witness, the policy rationale behind the rules requiring disclosure would not favor
necessitating this type of disclosure. The purpose of RCM 701(a)(6) is to provide the defense
with evidence it would not be able to gather through reasonable methods. The defense can and
should question its own witnesses. This is part of the defense’s strategy in creating a defense;
counsel should thoroughly question all witnesses to know whether or not the witness is harmful
to the case, or can serve as an asset. If the witness has done something to warrant an
investigation, the defense counsel should be able to find out about these acts through the
reasonable action of talking to the witness and gathering information. The defense should not
need impeachment evidence of a non-testifying witness because there is no need to impeach a
witness who never testifies. Likely, impeachment evidence of a non-testifying witness should be
treated similarly to Jencks evidence, and only should be disclosed if the witness actually testifies,
rather than prematurely disclosing possibly irrelevant evidence.
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IV. Conclusion
As seen throughout this paper, the prosecution is often required to disclose information
that either is exculpatory, or is impeachment evidence of a government witness. Due to the
policy rationale behind providing the defense with a wide amount of discovery in courts-martial
situations, a court will often find in favor of the defendant when determining whether or not the
evidence should be disclosed. Because the law is so unclear, prosecutors should likely err on the
side of disclosing evidence, rather than suppressing. In situations where privilege is a concern,
the prosecution should bring the evidence to the court in order to get a judicial determination as
to whether the evidence must be disclosed. While there may be concerns of secrecy surrounding
evidence, these concerns are many times outweighed by a defendant’s constitutional right to a
fair trial. In cases where there are no concerns regarding secrecy, the defendant’s right to a fair
trial will likely be the most important factor, and the prosecution should err in favor of disclosure
of impeachment evidence. While this paper does not address remedies, a defendant has a right to
a new trial in some circumstances where the prosecutor suppresses evidence, so it is in the
prosecutor’s best interest to simply disclose the evidence and be forthcoming about the
information within his/her possible control.

31

